group impacts in greater detail. A more extensive discussion of the implementation of the demonstration, nonquantitative findings, and transitional employment, in general, can be found in Prero and Thornton (1991) .
Description of the Demonstration
The objective of the demonstration was to determine the results of SSA's offering transitional employment training to a specific popula tion, as described in the next section. The effect of main interest was savings to the SSI program. That is, could SSA justify paying the cost of services on the expectation that the costs would be exceeded by the resulting reductions in SSI payments?
Population and Experimental Design
The participants in the demonstration were 745 SSI recipients aged 18 to approximately 40 with mental retardation. Job placement and training were provided by eight nonprofit agencies in various localities around the country, whose operations under the demonstration were funded mostly by grants from SSA. (These organizations are referred to here as the sites.)
SSA has a particular interest in the habilitation of persons with men tal retardation, since retardation is a leading cause of disability among SSI recipients. SSI statistics suggest that roughly 1.2 million children and adults under age 65 receive SSI payments on the basis of a primary diagnosis of mental retardation, some 29 percent of all SSI recipients under 65.' Based on the average monthly SSI disability payment of $402.47 in December 1994, payments to recipients with mental retar dation approximate $5.8 billion per year. In addition to these individu als, an unknown number of recipients whose primary diagnosis is some other condition are also mentally retarded.
Eighty-five percent of the people in the demonstration were drawn from a pool of some 12,000 SSI recipients whom SSA invited by letter to inquire about participation. The invitees were persons for whom mental retardation was listed as the primary or secondary diagnosis on their SSI records and who lived in the localities of the sites. To partici pate, the recipient had to volunteer and had to be accepted by the local site. The remaining 15 percent were SSI recipients who were recruited by the sites, generally through referrals from vocational and social ser vice agencies. The referred participants also had mental retardation.
The demonstration was designed as a formal experiment, in order to assure the rigor of the analysis of outcomes. Half of the participants, designated as the treatment group, were offered the demonstration's services, and half, the control group, were not. Individuals were assigned by random number to one of the groups after they agreed to participate, were accepted by the site, and had completed the partici pant questionnaire. (All participants and/or their guardians understood at the time of enrollment that the probability of being assigned to the control group was 50 percent.)
Members of the control group were free to obtain vocational and additional services from sources other than the demonstration. Thus, the test was not of the effect of the demonstration's services as com pared with no vocational services, but the effect of the demonstration's services compared with the services that were then otherwise available or that have since become available.
Some of the post-demonstration changes experienced by the treat ment group in employment, earnings, SSI, and other measures would have been realized even without demonstration services and should not be attributed to the demonstration. The extent to which change would have taken place regardless is measured by the experiences of the con trol group. Indeed, the average control group member, who earned $615 during the year following enrollment in the demonstration, earned about twice that in each of the third through sixth years (Decker and Thornton 1994, p. 23) .
Random assignment assured that the treatment and control groups were alike at the time of enrollment with respect to characteristics that were or were not measured or may not even be measurable. Compari son of known characteristics of the participants confirms that the two groups, in fact, resembled each other closely (Thornton, Dunstan, and Schore 1988, pp. 58-60, or Prero and Thornton 1991, pp. 12-13) . The two groups were alike in terms of their distributions by age, race, gen der, IQ scores, sources of income, receipt of benefits from assistance programs besides SSI, types of work experience, and other personal characteristics.
Characteristics of the Sample
The results of the demonstration can be generalized to a population described by the selection criteria of the sample: SSI recipients 18 to 40 years old with mental retardation who would volunteer for and be accepted by this sort of program. The results cannot be generalized to a population that consists of volunteers and nonvolunteers. Table 1 compares characteristics of the sample with those of the 11,430 persons who were invited by letter to participate and did not volunteer or were not accepted. These invitees comprise the large majority of SSI recipients in the sites' local areas who had a primary or secondary diagnosis of mental retardation and were in the 18-to-40 age range. (We might have preferred to compare the participants with recipients nationally of the same diagnosis and age, but we cannot readily identify all recipients by diagnosis.)
On average, the participants were somewhat younger than the invi tees. The proportions of males and blacks among the participants were somewhat higher than among the invitees. Mean earnings in the year prior to the demonstration were low for both groups but were twice as high for the participants as for the invitees.
Services and Providers
Key services of the transitional employment model for training are
• training by a job coach on a real job, that is, on a paid job consist ing of tasks that another worker would otherwise perform for the employer and in which the worker has an opportunity to interact with nondisabled coworkers or the public;
• placement in a potentially permanent real job, either the job on which the training was received or, after the training, in a similar position.
If the permanent placement is in a job that was not the training posi tion, additional instruction by the coach is available as needed. Subse- A job coach is a specialist in training persons with disabilities and is usually employed by a service agency rather than by the trainee's employer. The scope of training by the coach includes appropriate behavior on the job, relationships to supervisors, communication, transportation to the job, and other nonwork, as well as work, skills.
Training and intensive support are transitional in the sense that they are expected to be of limited duration, generally between 6 and 18 months. Transitional employment is intended as a bridge to working independently of vocational services except for occasional job-reten tion help. When the need for intensive support services is expected to be ongoing, the service model is usually referred to as supported employment. In the Transitional Employment Training Demonstration, job coaching and other intensive services were provided for a maxi mum of a year.
The demonstration sites provided the services. Of the eight sites, three were universities or university affiliated. They were:
• Children's Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts • Goodwill Industries, Milwaukee Area, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Two were independent rehabilitation agencies:
• AHEDD, Inc., Lemoyne, Pennsylvania, serving Harrisburg, Lan caster, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and York, Pennsylvania, and Dover, Delaware
• Center for Rehabilitation and Training of the Disabled, Chicago (also known as the CENTER)
Besides offering training and employment services, the sites provided or arranged for case management and other indirectly related services. SSA granted waivers to the trainees that protected their SSI status while in training. Subsequent amendments to the SSI statute now pro vide similar protection to all SSI recipients. The waivers did not change the way income reduces SSI payments to recipients and did not protect social security insurance benefits.
Data Collection
The main source of data on outcomes is the SSI administrative com puter files. SSA verifies and records the monthly earnings and other income of SSI recipients to determine the amount of the monthly pay ment. Historic records of earnings and income are retained by com puter, in order to refigure the payment amount retroactively for any month for which SSA receives new information relevant to the pay ment.
The record generally remains available even for SSI recipients whose earnings rise to a level at which no cash payment is made. Such recipients usually remain on the SSI rolls, and continue to report their incomes, for purposes of Medicaid eligibility. By the end of the sixth year following enrollment, 87 of the 745 participants had left the SSI rolls entirely. Their earnings and income data are, therefore, missing for one or more years (but their SSI payments are known to be zero).
Attrition was approximately the same from the treatment and con trol groups, at 11.7 percent of the former and 11.6 percent of the latter. The single most common reason for losing SSI eligibility was new entitlement to social security benefits. Decker and Thornton (1994, pp. 12-14 and 25-28) analyze the possibility of a differential impact of attrition on the treatment and control groups' average outcomes and show that it is unlikely that there is any substantial bias.
Data on personal characteristics of the participants come from three major sources: a uniform intake questionnaire that was administered by the sites to all participants (and/or their care givers) before random ization, IQ scores obtained from SSA medical documentation of dis-ability or released by the participants from other sources, and the computerized SSI records.
Data on hours of direct staff services provided to a subsample of cli ents were kept by all sites in a uniform manner. These data, collected in the demonstration's client service record, and records of program expenditures are the basis of the cost estimates.
Outcomes of the Demonstration

Measures of the Difference Made by the Demonstration
The net impact of the services on the treatment group is the differ ence between the outcomes the treatment group experienced and the outcomes that would have been realized without the demonstration ser vices, as measured by the experience of the control group. Most of the net impacts as reported here are adjusted using regression techniques to account for preexisting differences in characteristics between the treatment and control group members and for attrition of participants from the data file. However, as described, the preexisting treatmentcontrol differences are quite small, and, therefore, so are the conse quent econometric adjustments.
The control group's outcomes, as tabulated in this section, serve as the reference points for the net impacts. That is, an impact expressed in dollars plus the mean for the corresponding control group equals the outcome for the treatment group (with small econometric adjustments). For each impact, the table also lists the ratio of the impact to the con trol group outcome, expressed as the percentage change that is attrib uted to the training.
The impacts are labeled "estimated" because they estimate the con sequences of transitional employment training for an entire population, based on the experience of the demonstration's 745-member sample. (The population consists of all recipients of the same age and diagnosis who would volunteer for this type of training.)
Participants enrolled between May 1985 and June 1986. Each treat ment group member was eligible for demonstration-funded services for one year from the date of enrollment. Outcomes are reported for that year and for the five subsequent years, beginning each year at the month of the participant's enrollment, rather than at the same time for all participants. All dollar measures are adjusted for inflation to 1986 dollars. This facilitates comparison with the costs of the demonstration services, which were incurred from mid-1985 to mid-1987.
Summary of Outcomes
The impacts are presented as averages of all 375 members of the treatment group, despite the fact that 121 members of the group, 32 percent, were never placed in a training or permanent job. Some of those 121 refused the placements they were offered, some dropped out of the program, and some were not offered placement because the sites found it too difficult to serve them. (This is not a surprising result, since SSA encouraged the sites to accept participants with less than the usual level of screening for suitability.) It is necessary to include all members of the treatment group in the mean outcomes to preserve comparability with the control group. Also, the costs of the demonstra tion are averaged over all members of the treatment group.
Of the remaining 254 treatment group members, 127 were holding permanent jobs when their participation was completed. This is 34 per cent of the treatment group. Another 57 trainees (15 percent of the group) were placed in one or more permanent jobs but failed to retain those jobs. An additional 70 trainees (19 percent) were placed in train ing jobs but could not be subsequently placed in potentially permanent jobs (Thornton, Dunstan, and Schore 1988, p. 107) .
Demonstration services cost about $7,650 per treatment group member, of which somewhat more than $2,000 is attributable to the resources used to start up and terminate the demonstration (Thornton, Dunstan, and Schore 1988, pp. 117-130) . The service provided in the demonstration would thus cost an average of about $5,600 (1986 dol lars) in a program operating in a steady state over the long run. This amount includes expenditures for job coaching, job development, cli ent recruitment, and other activities performed directly for clients, as well as program administration and an allocated portion of agency overhead. Average cost at the individual demonstration sites is shown in table 2. Thornton, Dunstan, and Schore (1988, p 120 ) based on the Client Service Record and site financial records a. Costs to Portland Community College. Because the University of Washington primarily provided technical assistance to start this project, the univer sity's costs have been excluded from the operational cost The University of Washington costs totaled approximately $160,000 b These costs exclude payments for clients' wage subsidies and project costs incurred prior to the start of enrollment. c These costs are estimated as the product of average direct labor cost per client, the ratio of total labor cost to direct labor cost, and the ratio of total cost to total labor cost d. These estimates include the wages and fringe benefits of staff time devoted directly to serving specific clients The estimates are denved from Client Service Record data and project expenditures during 1986.
During the six-year observation period, the average trainee earned a total of $4,282 more due to the training. Earnings were approximately $10,256, which is 72 percent more than control group mean earnings (table 3) . Some or all of a participant's earnings during the first year may be thought of as being derived directly from participation in the demonstration. Earnings excluding that year are a measure of postdemonstration outcomes. The net impact on earnings for the total of years two through six is an increase of $3,736, which is 69 percent over the control group mean of $5,391 (Decker and Thornton 1994, p. 23) . The effect on SSI payments is small by any standard. The estimated six-year impact is a decrease of $870 per participant (table 4). For the second through sixth years, the estimated impact is a $731 decrease. This is a reduction of 5 percent from the means of $18,956 and $15,325 that the control group received over the six-and five-year peri ods, respectively (Decker and Thornton 1994, p. 31) . It amounts to about $12 per month. A mean reduction in SSI of $870 can be consistent with mean addi tional earnings of $4,282, depending on the operation of the SSI exclu sions. That is, income of recipients reduces their SSI payments dollar for dollar, but certain amounts of income are excluded from being counted against the SSI payment. If an SSI recipient has no income other than earnings, $85 of monthly earnings plus half the remaining earnings are excluded.
According to the preceding figures, a mean of only $870 was counted against SSI, of the mean $4,282 that was earned. The remain ing $3,412 of the earnings impact must have been excluded. On a monthly basis, these amounts correspond to $59 ($4,282/72 months) in mean additional earnings of which $47 ($3,412/72 months) was excluded, for six years. At least some treatment group members had income besides the income that the demonstration generated; their $85 exclusion may not have been available to apply to the additional dem onstration-based earnings. Thus, the extent to which the additional earnings could be excluded depends on the distribution of earnings among participants, not just on the means.
One reason for the exclusion of so large a proportion of earnings was that the participants' jobs were often part-time. Workers' total earnings are typically low when they work part-time, and the initial exclusion of $85 comprises a larger fraction of lower than of higher earnings. The 127 members of the treatment group who were in perma nent jobs when they exited the demonstration (see preceding discus sion) worked an average of 27 hours per week in those jobs.
The Younger Participants
Just over half of the participants were of age 25 or less. The out comes in this age range are informative with regard to transition from school to work, since students with disabilities can be entitled to public education until they are 22 years old. The SSI and earnings outcomes for this group (not regression adjusted) are presented in table 5.
Mean total SSI payments for the six years following enrollment in the demonstration fell by $1,376, from $20,402 for the controls to $19,026 for the treatment group. For the second through sixth years, the difference is $1,105, representing about the same proportionate relationship between treatment and control, -7 percent, as for the first through sixth years. SOURCE: SSA administrative data of the SSI program NOTE Estimates are based on observed means, not on multiple regression models. The sample for the SSI estimates consists of 383 individuals assigned to either the treatment group or the con trol group. The sample for the earnings estimates is the same, except for the exclusion of 20 mem bers of the treatment group and 23 members of the control group for whom earnings data are missing in one or more years Estimates are expressed in 1986 dollars. *Sigmficantly greater than zero at the 1 percent level of significance using a one-tail test These differences are larger, both absolutely and by percentage, than those reported for the entire age range (table 4) . However, based on a sample of the 383 participants aged 18 to 25 rather than on 745 partici pants of all ages, the differences for the younger group are not statisti cally significant.2
The differences in earnings are larger than the SSI differences and are statistically significant. The six-year and five-year differences are, respectively, $3,383 and $2,836. That is, the treatment group did 54 percent and 49 percent better in the respective time intervals. (Twenty members of the treatment group and 23 members of the control group are omitted from the earnings comparisons because their earnings data are missing in at least one year. The issue of attrition from the sample has been discussed.)
Although not shown in table 5, it is noteworthy that the control group's mean earnings rose from $490 in the year following enroll ment to $791 and $1,136 in the next two years, before reaching a pla teau. Mean earnings of the treatment group rose from $1,038 in the first year to $1,519 in the second year, fluctuating mildly after that to a mean of $1,773 in year six. Thus, the sharper rise in control group earnings accounts for the reduced difference between treatment and control groups, from 54 to 49 percent, when the first year's earnings are disregarded.
Costs and Benefits
Based on the preceding information, the costs of the demonstration far exceeded the reductions in SSI payments that SSA realized. This conclusion addresses the main question that the demonstration was intended to answer, but it is not a benefit-cost judgment in the standard sense. A full treatment of benefits must consider those to the federal government as a whole, to other levels of government, and to private organizations and individuals.3 A full treatment of costs must consider that, during training and subsequent employment, other services the client would have received may not be necessary.
Economic benefits that have not been considered here include, for example, the additional goods and services produced as a result of the employment of program participants. The counterpart of this produc tion is the workers' earnings and the income and payroll taxes paid by workers and employers. A comprehensive benefit-cost analysis would also account for personal and social benefits to the participants result ing from their greater role in the social mainstream.
Examples of services that might be rendered unnecessary by transi tional employment include sheltered work and other day activities. The costs of these services, which can amount to several thousand dollars per year, would have been borne by the federal or local governments or others. The observed cost of transitional employment should be adjusted to reflect the savings for these services (or the savings should be treated as another benefit). A transitional employment program that might be proposed for funding by a government agency with a broader mission than SSA's, or jointly by SSA and other agencies, would be more appropriately evaluated by a comprehensive benefit-cost analy sis.
Quantitative Outcomes of the Transitional Employment Training Demonstration
Qualifications of the Analysis
The conclusions of this report regarding the costs and benefits to SSA are subject to several qualifications. First, members of the control group may have received employment services from sources other than the demonstration. That is, the demonstration tested the effect of SSA's adding its services to existing opportunities. The test was not of the dif ference between service or no service.
The second qualification is that the conclusions of this experiment should be corroborated by additional research. Methods of providing transitional employment training can differ grossly or subtly among providers. An approach that focuses more on the effectiveness of spe cific training practices than did this demonstration could lead to other cost and benefit outcomes. Even in the present demonstration, in which the sites' services were organized according to certain unifying specifi cations (Prero and Thornton 1991, pp. 8-11) , the variation among sites' styles of operation and outcomes was sufficient to warrant analysis of cross-site differences. (Decker and Thornton's analysis of the site earn ings impacts "show a considerable level of variation across sites," although the samples were not large enough to support a statistically significant difference in these impacts across the eight sites [1994, pp. 65-77] .) Third, the costs per participant can vary greatly, depending on the treatment mode and operating efficiency. Within this demonstration, the estimated cost per participant for replication on an ongoing basis is $2,800 at the lowest cost site and over $8,000 at the highest cost site (table 2) . Administrative costs and organizational overhead, which are included, also varied widely.
Fourth, the rules of the demonstration severely limited the extent to which sites could screen applicants for the program. More comprehen sive screening could have led to more effective service. The main rea son for the policy was to limit the personal involvement of members of the control group. In this way, the intake process would be as neutral as practical with regard to the control group's desire to seek training and employment. Limited contact prior to randomization also reduced the possible disappointment to participants who were subsequently assigned to control status. Abbreviated screening incidentally pro-moted the demonstration's goal of testing transitional employment on a wide variety of participants.
Screening and Targeting
One way to increase the ratio of benefits to costs in a project of this nature is to target services to groups for whom net impacts are expected to be high. Then, depending on the criteria for targeting, screening methods may have to be developed to assure that the group that was targeted is the one that is served.
Targeting does not necessarily mean "creaming," or serving the cli ents with the mildest disabilities. Although those who are least dis abled might be expected to accomplish the most after training, they are also the ones who would accomplish the most without training. Thus, the net impact of the training might not be large.
Analysis of subgroups of the demonstration sample suggests, but does not lead conclusively to, some possible targeting criteria. For example, table 6 shows that, classifying age in three subgroups, the greatest impact was experienced by participants 22-to-29 years old and that this impact is statistically significant. The differences in impacts among the age subgroups, however, are not statistically significant. Participants with IQ scores greater than 554 show the highest impacts among the subgroups based on IQ score.
Another subgrouping that shows differing impacts is based on a sub jective rating of the participant's high, medium, or low probability of success, as judged by the interviewer during the intake process. Again, the impact of the high-probability subgroup is not dissimilar enough from that of the combined medium-and low-probability subgroup for the difference to be statistically significant. The observed impacts, nev ertheless, suggest that program staff have some ability to forecast out comes even beyond the predictions based on client characteristics incorporated in the regression model (Decker and Thornton 1994, pp. 47-48) . One interpretation of staff workers' insight is that they con sciously or unconsciously consider client characteristics that were not measured and may be difficult to measure. These factors might include motivation and family support, both of which are anecdotally thought to be important. SOURCE Decker and Thornton (1994, pp. 40-41 and 44-45) , based on SSA administrative data of the SSI program and the Demonstration Intake Data Collection forms. NOTE Estimated are based on multiple regression models that control for individual preenrollment characteristics and site The sample includes between 650 and 745 individuals assigned to either the treatment group or the control group. The exact size of the sample depends pnmanly on attrition from the SSI program Statistical tests indicate that attntion does not bias the estimated impacts Estimates are expressed in 1986 dollars. * Significantly at the 5 percent level, earnings are greater than zero by a one-tail test and SSI is greater or less than zero by a two-tail test. **Sigmficantly at the 1 percent level, earnings are greater than zero by a one-tail test and SSI is greater or less than zero by a two-tail test, a The hypothesis that the impacts for all subgroups in the category are equal can be rejected at the 10 percent level of significance.
It should be noted that, in the analysis of subgroups, the regression model holds all other characteristics constant when analyzing the impact with respect to a particular characteristic. Also, the present sub group analysis is limited to benefits. Costs cannot be compared with benefits within subgroups because the costs are not known at that level of detail.
Moving beyond the overall mean impacts, analysis of the distribu tion of earnings provides another perspective on the potential for tar geting. A distribution of earnings can be constructed by summing the earnings of each participant over the six postenrollment years. The sums of earnings of the treatment group are ordered from lowest to highest, as are the sums of earnings of the control group. (Earnings of 39 members of the treatment group and 37 members of the control group are omitted from the distributions because data are missing in at least one year.)
We then compare, for example, the highest third of the treatment group's distribution with the highest third of the control distribution. This comparison does not assume that the selected portion of the con trol group is the counterpart of the selected portion of the treatment group. Rather, the highest third of the control group yields an upper bound for the sums of earnings of any third of the control group, no matter how selected.
Mean earnings of the highest third of the treatment group are $23,645 over the six-year period, as compared with $14,479 in mean earnings for the highest third of the control group (table 7) . Since the control group mean is an upper bound, this implies that the net impact for these members of the treatment group is at least the difference of $9,166. (Statistical significance has not been calculated.)
Excluding earnings in the year of demonstration services, mean earnings of the highest third of the treatment group are $21,596 over years two through six. Mean earnings for the highest third of the con trol group are $13,243 for the second through sixth years, yielding an impact of at least $8,353. Similar calculations for the highest two-thirds of each group's distri bution yield a treatment mean of $15,103, a control mean of $9,071, and a difference of $6,032 for the six-year observation period. Over years two through six, the treatment mean is $13,583, the control mean is $8,224, and the difference is $5,358.
Among participants in the 25 years and younger segment, one-third of the sample consists of 59 treatment group members and 55 control group members, after excluding cases with missing earnings data. The mean earnings of the highest-earning one-third, totaled over six years, are calculated to be $21,418 and $14,431, respectively, or a minimum difference of $6,987. Over the second through sixth years, mean total earnings are $19,657 for the treatment group and $13,436 for the con trols, a minimum difference of $6,221. This suggests some potential for targeting in the years of transition to adulthood, as well.
These analyses of the distributions of earnings give us no hint of the targeting or screening criteria that might be necessary to obtain desired results in a population. However, we can infer that, if research on the characteristics of clients produces appropriate criteria, transitional employment could be found to be cost-effective for a portion of the population, even on the basis of a narrow set of benefits.
Effective Practices
Another way to increase the ratio of benefits to costs is to modify the provision of services so that benefits are increased. For example, placement in part-time rather than in full-time jobs was cited as a rea son why the decline in SSI benefits is so much less than the rise in earnings. A focus on full-time placement might be more cost-effective. On the other hand, development of part-time jobs is easier and, thus, probably less expensive. Also, an emphasis on full-time jobs might draw a different mix of clients into the program, which could alter the impacts. Decker and Thornton (1994, pp. 65-76) infer certain suggestions for effective practices based in part on apparent differences in impacts across sites. The sites with the largest impacts were more flexible in offering a wide array of job placements, so that the circumstances and interests of clients could be better matched to jobs. The more success ful sites were also willing to work with clients for longer periods of time and did not require that clients be employed in jobs reserved for training before being placed in a potentially permanent job. Prero and Thornton (1991, pp. 17-22) base additional suggestions on their observation of the demonstration. One is that training organi zations should recognize that convenient transportation is important to success in every phase of training and employment. However, since these suggestions are not based on the experimental design of the dem onstration, they generally fall outside the scope of the present paper.
In summary, the outcomes do not support the hypothesis that sav ings in SSI payments cover the cost for SSA to offer transitional employment services as provided in this demonstration. However, it appears that outcomes can be enhanced by more narrow targeting and by services that are better designed in light of ongoing research.
Further, cost effectiveness might be achieved in a program that had a broader set of economic objectives and, therefore, accounted for more kinds of benefits. Such gains would include the productivity of other wise unemployed workers and reduced costs for other social services. The calculation of benefits would also value the greater community regard and self-respect that individuals would have from participating in the producing mainstream of society.
NOTES
NOTE: This paper represents the opinions of the author, not necessarily those of the Social Secunty Administration Thanks are due Craig Thornton and his associates at Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., and to Kalman Rupp, Lewis Frain, and Salvatore Galhcchio for their assistance 1 Kochhar estimates that 28 7 percent of SSI recipients under age 65 have a primary diagno sis of mental retardation, based on 1988 data (1991, table 12) . A total of 4,176,729 persons under age 65 received SSI payments in December 1994.
2 Not being statistically significant means that, even in a situation where training would have no effect whatsoever on the mean SSI of a population, there would be a reasonable probability of observing a decline of $1,376 in the mean SSI payment of a sample of that population. A small decline is attributable to a sample's not being representative of the population from which it was selected. The smaller the sample, the greater the nsk that it is not representative.
3 For a discussion of comprehensive benefit-cost analyses of rehabilitation programs, see Burkhauser and Haveman (1982, pp 68 ff) 4 This observation relative to IQ level does not correspond to a finding in another transitional employment demonstration that some impacts were greater on the employment of persons with moderate as opposed to mild retardation See Kerachsky et al (1985, p 82 and elsewhere) 
